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ARTICLES
WRITTEN EVIDENCE IN ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEEDINGS: A PLEA FOR LESS TALK
Robert J. Corbere
They never taste who always drink; They always talk, who never
think. Matthew Prior, Upon His Passage in the Scaligeriana

T

HE notion that talk is the absence of thought is more poetry than
analysis. Nevertheless, lawyers know that all talk is not thought
and that there is at least a grain of truth in the poet's logic. Some of
the same logic may mercifully be applied to the proceedings of administrative agencies to test whether all the talk in such proceedings
is necessary to a rational result and sound implementation of public
policy.
The thesis here is that administrative agencies resort far too often
to the talk of oral hearings when written evidence would suffice. Indeed, such evidence would in many cases lead to better results with
reduced worldoad.
The recent travail of the Civil Aeronautics Board in its attempt to increase air fares and thereby rescue financially undernourished air carriers from inadequate revenues will set the stage for this discussion. It
started in 1969 when the domestic earnings of all certificated route air
carriers precipitously dropped, as of June 30, 1969, to $10,467,000 from
$178,561,000 the year before.1 The decline was escalating rapidly as
evidenced by the fact that for the twelve months ending June 30, 1970,
the industry sustained an across-the-board loss of $42,160,000.2 The
Board was presented with near crisis.
The carriers commenced filing air fare increases in August.3 The
Board was confronted with strong pleas of the carriers to allow the
increases to become effective as published. Equally strong resistance
'Member of the District of Columbia Bar. B.S., University of Kansas, 1946; LL.B.,
Washburn University, 1950; Graduate Work in Law, University of Michigan, 1950-51.
1CAB AIR CARRIER FnA.aNciA STATisscs, (June 1969) (figures are net income after
special items).
2 Id. (June 1970). At the end of 1970 the loss had "grown to $183,688,000 for the
calendar year. Id. (Dec. 1970).
3 See CAB Order 69-8-108 (Aug. 19, 1969).
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came from consumer representatives who urged suspension of the tariffs
setting forth the increases and their investigation plus a general fare in4
vestigation to determine the reasonableness of the fare structure.
The last general fare investigation had taken some four and one-half
years to complete. 5 The Board was reluctant to repeat that performance,
except as a last resort, and said so.6 It adopted a less time-consuming
and less formal procedure by holding informal conferences between
representatives of the carriers and the Board and by ordering oral argument. 7 The argument was to be preceded by the filing of complaints or
statements of position by the parties." Thirty-two Congressmen, led
by the Honorable John E. Moss (California), who had sought a general
fare investigation and complained that they were excluded from the
meetings between the carriers and the Board, refused to take part in
the argument on the ground that the Board had already made its decision. The argument was held nonetheless and the Board issued its decision eight days thereafter.9
Outdoing critics who complain of a lack of standards in its decisions, 10 the Board concluded to allow an increase in fares of about 6
per cent and then stated in detail the fare formula that it would approve." The carriers were invited to file tariffs conforming to the
Board's decision. They did so. The complaining Congressmen were
4 See

CAB Order 69-9-68 (Sept. 12, 1969).

5 General Passenger-Fare Investigation, 32 C.A.B. 291 (1960).
6

On a subsequent occasion the Board explained that:
[W]e are cognizant of the fact that the General Passenger Fare Investigation,

Docket 8008, in which the Board issued its decision in 1960, was an extremely
lengthy and complex investigation, and we have been reluctant to embark on a
second such investigation unless it appeared that there was no reasonable alternative.
CAB Order 70-1-147 (Jan. 29, 1970) at 2.
7 See CAB Order 69-8-108 (Aug. 19, 1969).
sId.
9 CAB Order 69-9-68 (Sept. 12, 1969).
10 Friendly, The Federal Administrative Agencies: The Need for Better Definition,
of Standards, 75 HARV. L. REv. 1055, 1072-97 (1962).

11 CAB Order 69-9-6g (Sept. 12, 1969). The Board first held that the proposed tariffs
then on file "may be unjust, unreasonable, unjustly discriminatory, unduly preferential
or unduly prejudicial, or otherwise unlawful and should be investigated." Id. at 3. It

employed the powers granted it by Section 10 02 (g) of the Federal Aviation Act, 49
U.S.C. 5 1482(g) (1970), to suspend the proposed tariffs. The Board then stated the
increase and the fare structure it would approve.
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United
not to be so easily put down and they sought review in the
2
Circuit.1
Columbia
of
District
the
for
,States Court of Appeals
The principal issue in court was whether the fares published pursuant
to the Board's order were made by the Board or the carriers. If they
were made by the Board, the provisions of Section 1002 (d) of the Federal Aviation Act,13 requiring notice and hearing, were applicable. If
they were made by the carriers, the only question would be whether
by the Board and this
the predecessor tariffs were properly suspended
14
question is not open to judicial review.
The court held that "[el ven a cursory reading of the order makes it
clear that the Board told the carriers what rates to file; it set forth a
step-by-step formula requiring major changes in rate-making practices
and in rates which it expected the carriers to adopt." 15 Thus conclud'ing that the fares were Board-made, the court said:
[T]he Board concededly took this action after closed sessions with
carrier representatives, [and] without statutory public hearings .... 16
This, the court found, "is contrary to the statutory rate-making plan in
that it fences the public out of the rate-making process and tends to
frustrate judicial review." 17 The case was remanded to the Board for
further proceedings.' 8
12 Moss

v. CAB, 430 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1970).

1349 U.S.C. § 1482(d) (1970).
14 Cf. Arrow Transp. Co. v. Southern Ry., 372 U.S. 658 (1963).

Although this case
arises under the Interstate Commerce Act, it would govern application of the Federal
Aviation Act because of the similarity of language of the two statutes.
15 Moss v. CAB, 430 F.2d 891, 899-900 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
16 Id. at 900.
1 Id. at 893.
is The court held that the "order is invalid and the tariffs filed by the carriers based
'thereon are unlawful." Id. at 902. The unlawful tariffs were purged when the Board
vacated the offending portions of its illegal order and allowed the 'carriers to ,file
tariffs "free of any compulsion" in the prior order, the new tariffs to be effective
October 15, 1970. CAB Order 70-7-128 (July 28, 1970). A predictable aftermath of the
court order was the filing of a spate of lawsuits by passengers seeking refund of overcharges resulting from the unlawful fares despite the fact that reparations are not
authorized by the Federal Aviation Act as they are by the Interstate Commerce Act.
See Weidberg v. American Airlines, Inc., Civil No. 70C-1879 (N.D. Ill. 1971). In addition, Congressman Moss and his colleagues requested the Board to institute an "adjudicatory proceeding" to determine appropriate relief for the alleged overcharges. The
Board has responded by ordering an investigation into the reasonableness of the fares in
effect during the term of the order declared unlawful by the court. See CAB Order
71-2-109 (Feb. 25, 1971). If the fares are found reasonable, notwithstanding the fact they
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The Board had argued in -effect, that to require it to go through the
statutory hearing process would prevent it from taking timely action
to provide the carriers with needed revenues in times of rapidly rising
costs. The petitioners responded that:
[T] he Board appears to be confusing a general passenger fare investigation ... with the hearing that Petitioners urge is always necessary
under Section 1002(d) whenever the Board undertakes to prescribe or
approve rates. 19
The court did not specify the type of hearing required but saw "no inconsistency between adhering to the statutory plan and awarding a
speedy increase in carrier revenues." 20 It added that:
The statute does not require a complete, time-consuming, scholarly
and theoretical review of all aspects of rate-making before the Board
passes upon proposals which are submitted. The Board is expected to
use its experience gleaned from ongoing studies and investigations in
its day-to-day activities, and it can act with reasonable speed as long
as it affords public notice, holds a proper hearing, and takes the statu2
tory factors into account when it determines rates. '
Thus, a little over a year after the Board first addressed itself to the
critical revenue needs of the carriers, it was back where it started. There
remained to the Board its traditional discretion to suspend or not to
suspend new tariff filings (with its immunity from judicial review) and
its power to prescribe new rates under conventional notice and hearing
procedures. It employed both powers. It declined to suspend tariffs
filed by the carriers to replace those declared unlawful, insofar as such
new tariffs were similar to the latter. 22 In addition, it proceeded with
were procedurally unlawful under the court order, the refund of overcharges would presumably not be required. The Board proceeding is a trial type hearing to take place in
Feburary of 1972.
19 430 F.2d at 901 n.39.
20 430 F.2d at 901.

211d.
22 The Board said:

We recognize that the fares we are permitting to continue in effect beyond
October 15, 1970, utilize the same fare structure embodied in the Board's order
that the Court in the Moss case found invalid for procedural reasons. We cannot
accept the contention, however, that these fares are unlawful for that reason.
As noted previously, our Order 70-7-128 expressly freed the carriers of any
compulsion of the invalid order. The carriers were free to file tariffs based upon
any fare structure they saw fit, and did so. It is true that, with a few exceptions,
the tariffs filed embodied fare structures bearing some similarity to the current
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the general fare investigation which it had previously instituted, using
conventional hearing techniques.2 3
To speed up decision, the general fare case was separated into nine
separate phases to be moved along contemporaneously as nearly as practicable.24 The first three related to aircraft depreciation, leased aircraft, 25
and deferred federal income taxes.2 6 These three phases were handled in
rule-making proceedings. The other six involved joint fares,2 7 discount
fares, load factor and seating configurations, 2 fare level, rate of return
and fare structure. In all six of these phases, trial type hearings before
Hearing Examiners were conducted. Decisions in all phases were
rendered within one year except for the fare structure phase which was
still in hearing before an examiner in late 1971.
An effort was made in the early stages of the investigation to avoid
trial-type hearings. American Airlines moved for adoption of a procedure based on written evidence and oral argument for the last six
phases.29 This was opposed by a number of parties, including the Constructure. However, this reflects the carriers' own choice in the matter, rather
than the Board's.
CAB Order 70-9-123 (Sept. 24, 1970) at 11-12. Sticking to its guns the Board suspended
new tariffs of those independently minded carriers who strayed from the general structure embodied in the tariffs declared unlawful by the court. Id.
23 CAB Order 70-1-147 (Jan. 29, 1970).
24 CAB Order 70-2-121 (Feb. 26, 1970).
25 The issue to be dealt with was whether rental charges should be treated as an
expense or whether the value of the aircraft should be included in the investment base
as a constructed figure and a constructive depreciation expense allowed. Id. at 3.
26 The issue was whether accruals for deferred income taxed under accelerated depreciation should be included in the investment base and whether actual or normalized
income taxes should be recognized as an expense. Id. at 3.
27 Joint fares cover through service by two or more carriers. The issues in this phase
related to the reasonableness of joint fares, whether additional joint fares should be
published and the reasonableness of the divisions of joint fares among participating
carriers. Id. at 3-4.
28 This phase was later separated into two additional phases, one dealing with load
factor standards and the other seating configurations. CAB Order 70-11-91 (Nov. 19,
1970).
29 The proposed procedure was outlined by American as follows:
a) Bureau Counsel's proposed statement of issues, request for information, statement with respect to procedural matters, and proposed procedural dates.
b) Motions by carriers and/or comments on Bureau Counsel's submission.
c) Conference between Examiner and parties.
d) Response to information requests.
e) Written statements of position and proposed findings and conclusions of each
party, including exhibits and argument in support thereof.
f) Examiner's recommended decision (unless record is certified to the Board for
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gressmen who had requested a general fare investigation, on the ground
that it would deprive the parties of "the fundamental right to crossexamination." Unfortunately, the issue hardly reached the light of day
when American withdrew its motion less than two weeks after it was
filed. 30
The ghost of judicial hearings haunts these proceedings. It is less
than clear, however, that such hearings are either necessary or desirable.
Only a feeble glow was cast by the court in the Moss case on the question of what would suffice for a proper hearing. Yet its recognition of
the need for an early decision and its expressed willingness to accept at
least an interim decision "on the basis of incomplete data," suggests that
something less than a full trial-type hearing would be lawful.3x The
Board might have proceeded on the basis of written evidence and oral
argument. This would surely have been sufficient to enable it to satisfy
the court's requirement that a determination that the need for prompt
action requires an interim decision on rates subject to revision "once
more complete information is obtained," is a "conclusion [that] is reasonable and based upon substantial evidence." 32 Even in the case of the
Domestic Passenger-FareInvestigation,33 where a final decision on fares
was to be rendered, the Board might have accepted American's proposal
for the use of written evidence and oral argument. Granted that the
right of cross-examination must not be denied in a proper case, a full34
dress hearing is not necessary for this purpose.
I.

THE ADVANTAGES

OF WRITTEN EVIDENCE IN

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS

It should be emphasized that the suggestion here for greater use of
written evidence is not simply to urge that evidence be reduced to
writing before it becomes a part of the record. The major federal regutentative decision without issuance of an Examiner's recommended decision).
g) Exceptions to Examiner's recommended decision (or tentative decision of the
Board).
h) Briefs.
i) Oral Argument.
30 CAB Order 70-4-26 (April 7, 1970).
31Moss v. CAB, 430 F.2d 891, 901-02 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
321d.

33 See pp. 200-01 supra.
34 It is subsequently

suggested in this article that any hearing could be limited to
cross-examination and to matters genuinely in dispute which are specifically identified.
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latory agencies require prehearing circulation among the parties of statistical studies, financial projections and statements of witnesses according to a schedule fixed, usually at, or as a result of, prehearing conferences supervised by the Hearing Examiner.f5 All agencies could well
adopt the practice. Otherwise hearings on complex economic, scientific and other technical subjects can become a useless formiality at one
extreme, or an unmanageable exchange among largely uninformed combatants at the other.
The proposal here goes beyond such practice. It is to substitute written evidence for oral hearing in all cases except where it is shown to
be impracticable or unlawful. The Attorney General's Committee on
Administrative Procedure saw advantage in both techniques. Referring
to the substitution of written evidence for oral hearing, which it called
"shortened procedure" after the practice of the Department of Agriculture and the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Committee said:
The Committee believes that expedition and simplification of formal
administrative proceedings can further be achieved by substitution, in
The
appropriate situations, of written evidence for oral evidence ....
Committee sees great promise in the shortened procedure as a method
of augmenting accuracy, economy, and convenience. It is commended
to all administrative agencies. 3 6
The Committee then referred to written evidence for oral hearings, as
follows:
In types of litigation where the entire case is not susceptible to the
shortened procedure, some of the facts may nevertheless be presented
better in writing than orally. Where the matter in dispute is technical or dependent upon records (e.g., the labor cost or volume of
production of a plant), it would seem helpful to reduce the material
to writing in advance of the hearing, distribute it to the parties and
require the author to appear at the hearing for clarification or cross35
It is an unwritten practice of the Federal Power Commission. It is observed by the
Federal Communications Commission, especially in broadcast proceedings. See 47 C.F.R.
S 1.253 (d) (1971). It is encouraged by the Interstate Commerce Commission but observed only sporadically. See 49 C.F.R. 5 1100.84(a) (1971). It is expressly prescribed
in the rules of the Civil Aeronautics Board:
Evidence shall be presented in written form by all parties wherever feasible, as
the examiner may direct. 14 C.F.R. S 302.24(b) (1971).
36 1941 FiNAr, REP. oF THE AiT'y GENr. Comma. oN ADMINsIRATrVE P. 69 [hereinafter
cited as ATr'Y GEN. REP.].
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examination if it were desired. Lengthy testimony of a complex
character is not easy to comprehend in the hearing room nor can satisfactory cross-examination follow immediately upon its conclusion. A
far better understanding of the evidence and a great saving of time
and expense would be attained if the method above described were
37
employed.
Except for the reference to "clarification or cross-examination if it
were desired," the advantages cited by the Committee for written evidence in oral hearings apply equally to the use of written evidence
without oral hearings. It is the oral examination of written evidence that
can unnecessarily prolong a proceeding, add expense for the parties and
the agency, and unduly complicate the decisional process. This was
recognized by the late James Landis when he reported to Presidentelect Kennedy on the Civil Aeronautics Board among other regulatory
agencies:
The inordinate delay in [the Civil Aeronautics Board's] disposition
of pending cases and the complexity of these proceedings arises out
of the procedures it applies to them. . . The disposition of these
matters [applications for route extensions, new routes and new services] pursues no pattern or plan.... All the issues in such a proceeding
are handled by the lengthy process of examining and cross-examining
witnesses. This is a wasteful manner of establishing many of the basic
facts.38
Dean Landis' comments are certainly applicable to complex statistical
or scientific data prepared by the expert. The usual functions of crossexamination to test the witness' memory, veracity or ability to observe
matters about which testimony is given have little or no significance in
this situation. Other reasons assigned for cross-examination of experts
can be served by written procedure in th'e usual case.3 9
37 Id. at 69-70.
38 LANDIS, REPORT ON RErULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT

41 (printed for
the use of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 1960) [hereinafter cited as LANDIS RE.PORT].
39 In 1 COMM'RS REP. ON ADMINISTRATiVE ADJUDICATION IN THE STATE OF N.Y. 194-95
(1942) [hereinafter cited as COMM'RS REP.], it is said:
Where expert testimony is concerned, cross-examination serves also to test the
basis of the expert's opinion. Such tests are of obvious value in any attempt to
arrive at the truth in accurate detail, even assuming a purpose on the part of the
witness to tell the truth. Besides assisting in this way in the accurate decision of
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The objection most frequently made in litigated cases to the use of
written evidence without oral hearing is that it denies a "fundamental
right of cross-examination." Then, too, many administrative practitioners feel that the mere threat of cross-examination is enough to discipline the witness against placing a higher value on advocacy than the
truth. There is justification for this feeling. That is not to say, however, that cross-examination should be placed among rights that are so
fundamental that they become ends in themselves.
Cross-examination is simply a tool for arriving at the truth. Rebuttal
is another such tool. The use of disinterested experts under the aegis of
the agency may serve the same purpose. The point is that cross-examination is not the only means of arriving at a full and true disclosure
of the facts or a sine qua non to a fair hearing. It should not be accorded
such importance as to prevent substitution of written evidence for oral
hearing. Whether it, in fact, has such importance in the legal scale of
values is a question explored next.
II. THE RIGHT OF CRoss-ExxANATiOw IN ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEEDINGS

Nearly thirty years ago a comprehensive and knowledgeable study
of administrative law posed the questionIn what circumstances is it legally necessary to afford an opportunity
to cross-examine a person who has furnished to an administrative
tribunal, otherwise than by his own testimony, evidence which the
tribunal takes into account in its determination (such evidence having
been furnished, e.g., in the form of an affidavit or a letter or a report,
or through the hearsay testimony of another)?40

The author concluded that this is a question "to which the decided cases
do not supply a clear answer .... " 41
42
Since that study was published, the Administrative Procedure Act
controverted issues of fact, cross-examination may elicit from a witness concessions
that will in effect remove disputed issues from the case.
It is submitted that these considerations can be met as well by written rebuttal, written
interrogatories to the expert and statements of the parties in most cases. In other cases,
cross-examination limited to specific matters could be allowed, as discussed infra.
40 CO M'Rs RmE. 196.
41 Id.
42 5

US.C. §5 551-59 (1970).
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has become law and court decisions have multiplied on the matter of
rights to a hearing. These should and do offer at least some clarification
to the answer sought in the New York study. 43
A two-step inquiry is involved. First, is there a hearing requirement?
There can be no claim to a right of cross-examination without such a
requirement. Second, what is the nature of the hearing required? The
principal sources of light for these questions are the due process clauses
of the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution, and governing statutes. The latter may be the Administrative Procedure Act or the enabling act for the administrative agency, or both.
The authorities demonstrate that, even where a hearing is required,
there is no "fundamental right to cross-examination" in the constitutional
sense. Whether such a right exists at all in a given case, in the absence
of express statutory command, depends upon the nature of the issue
presented.
A. The Due Process Cases
There has always been an elusive quality about the meaning of procedural "due process of law." In an early case, the Supreme Court
proclaimed that "[i]n all cases, that kind of procedure is due process
44
.
of law which is suitable and proper to the nature of the case. ...
Sixty-six years later, the Court was saying essentially the same thing:
[D]ue process of law has never been a term of fixed and invariable
content. This is as true with reference to oral argument as with
respect to other elements of procedural due process. For this Court
has held in some situations that such argument is essential to a fair
hearing, Londoner v. Denver 210 U.S. 373, in others that argument
submitted in writing is sufficient. Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S.
468, 481.45

The "situations" considered by the Court have included orders pursuant to the Emergency Price Control Act of World War II for the
fixing of maximum prices and rents, under which final orders could be
issued without hearing and before protests were filed.46 In Yakus v.
43See generally 1 K. DAVis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATiSE 407-512 (1958).
44 Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 289 (1882).
46 FCC v. WJR, The Goodwill Station, Inc., 337 U.S. 265, 275-76 (1949).
46Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944); Bowles v. Willingham, 321 US. 503

(1944).
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United States47 the defendant in a criminal prosecution for violation of
a pricing order had not filed a protest after the order was issued and entered the defense that the protest procedures were a denial of due

process. The Court rejected the defense, saying:
While the hearing on a protest may be restricted to the presentation
of documentary evidence, affidavits and briefs, the Act contemplates,
and the Administrator's regulations provide for, a full oral hearing upon
a showing that written evidence and briefs "will not permit the fair
and expeditious disposition of the protest." . . . In advance of application to the Administrator for such a hearing, we cannot well say
whether its denial in any particular case would be a denial of due

process. 48

The factual situation in Bowles v. Willingham4 9 was somewhat different
in that instead of an order of general applicability for the future the
Regional Rent Director issued an order reducing Mrs. Willingham's
rents after notice and the filing by her of objections accompanied by
supporting affidavits. 50 The Court held that the right of judicial review
in the Emergency Court of Appeals "satisfies the requirements of due
process" even though the rent order became effective without any prior
hearing. " '
47 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
48 Id. at 436.
49 321 U.S. 503 (1944).
50 The Court held in Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441
(1915) that an order of general applicability increasing the valuation of taxable property
in Denver is legislative in character and requires no hearing. The Court cited the case
in Willingham and did not consider Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 386 (1908) in
which it held that an order for an assessment for street improvement was particular
or adjudicatory in nature, entitling the assessed party to "the right to support his allegations by argument, however brief, and, if need be, by proof, however informal."
However, in Londoner the complaining party was given no oral hearing of any kind
whereas in Willingham there was a right to appeal to the Emergency Court of Appeals
after the rent order was issued. Cf. 150 East 47th Street Corp. v. Creedon, 162 F.2d
206, 210 (Emer. Ct. App. 1947) where the court held that a rent reduction order is
quasi-judicial requiring "an opportunity for a hearing-not necessarily formal in character-before the reduction order becomes effective." The court's reference to procedure
'"not necessarily formal" would appear not to require an oral hearing of the trial type.
5
1 Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 520-21 (1944). In Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v.
Administrator, 312 U.S. 126, 152-53 (1941) the Court held that due process does not
require a hearing before a statutory committee which made minimum wage recommendations to the Administrator where there was a full hearing before the Administrator who merely approved or disapproved, but had no power to revise the recommendations of the Committee. In Willingham, the Court appears to go one step further by
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In these decisions, the Court made no distinctions based on the fact
that one involved a general order and the other (Willingham) a specific
order addressed to an identified person on individual grounds. In Londoner v. Denver and Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of
Equalization these distinctions were made. 52 It is arguable that the overriding policy of wartime price and wage controls is an underlying
premise in Yakus and Wilingham.5 Still, taken at face value, the decisions appear to mean that an oral hearing before an administrative
agency is not a requisite of due process where there are other opportunities to be heard. Without a right to an oral hearing, of course, there
can be no right of cross-examination.
An important exception to the rule of these decisions is the unusual
situation in which the issues involve interests of a private litigant which
are deemed to outweigh the public interest. Thus, the Court has held
that a welfare recipient presumably dependent upon benefits for a living
is entitled to an evidentiary hearing, with the right to confront and
54
cross-examine witnesses, before termination of such benefits.

It is significant that even when the Court finds violation of due
process requirements for an opportunity to be heard, it does not mention
cross-examination in the usual case.55 There is nevertheless enough latitude in the holdings of the Court to allow for a requirement of crossexamination where there is a showing that this is essential to a fair hearing under the circumstances.
Such circumstances may have been presented in Philadelphia Co. v.
SEC.56 In that case, Pittsburgh Railways Company, a subsidiary of a
public utility subject to the Public Utility Holding Company Act was
holding that the review proceeding in the Emergency Court of Appeals is enough to
comply with due process despite the absence of a hearing before the agency.
5a See note 50 supra.
5S See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 459-60 (1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
54 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263-64, 270 (1970).
55 See Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. PUC, 301 U.S. 292 (1937), where the use of extra-record
facts in an administrative determination of rates for a utility without prior notice to
the parties and without opportunity for rebuttal was held to deny due process rights.
Cf. Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468 (1936), in which the Court said:
Argument may be oral or written. The requirements are not technical. id. at 481.
ICC v. Louisville & N.R.R., 227 U.S. 88, 93 (1913) where the Court does refer to a
right of cross-examination, is not a due process case. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970) is also distinguishable as involving the unusual personal interest of the welfare
recipient.
56 175 F.2d 808 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
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exempt from such Act, by reason of being a non-utility. It was in
reorganization and its securities were guaranteed by the parent company.
The plan of reorganization was approved by the Pennsylvania Public
Utilities Commission in a proceeding in which the Securities and Exchange Commission appeared and opposed the plan. The Commission's
opposition, however, could not be made effective because the reorganization court had exclusive control so long as the exemption continued. If
the exemption were removed the court would lose its jurisdiction.
Unfurling its banner, the Commission issued a notice of rule-making
for revocation of exemptions for subsidiaries of Public Utility Holding
Act companies whose securities were guaranteed by the parent. The
effect was to revoke the exemption only for Pittsburgh Railways Company. In fact the Commission said in a letter that the proposed rule
would "be primarily applicable to Pittsburgh Railways Company."
In its notice the Commission declared that there were "situations" in
which security structures of holding companies and subsidiaries were
so "entangled" as to require regulation. It said further that its "experience" suggested that continued exemption would not be in the public
interest.
The Commission notice called for a written evidence proceeding
i.e., one for comments, views, and written data to be followed by oral
argument. The holding company reacted vigorously by inter alia, requesting an oral hearing with the cross-examination of Commission personnel in regard to the "situations" and 'experience" alleged in the
notice of rule-making. When this was denied it submitted an offer of
proof which described the Commission's participation in the proceeding
before the Pennsylvania Public Utilities Commission. It apparently
also pointed out that another holding company structure was in reorganization but would not be affected because the parent had not guaranteed the securities of the subsidiary.
On appeal, the court held that the action was "particular and immediate," making it adjudicatory in nature and requiring a trial-type
hearing. The court said:
It is "elementary also in our system of law that adjudictory action
cannot be validly taken by any tribunal, whether judicial or administrative, except upon a hearing wherein each party shall have opportunity to know the claims of his opponent, to hear the evidence introduced against him, to cross-examine witnesses, to introduce evidence in
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his own behalf, and to make argument. This is a requirement of the
due process clause of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution (emphasis added). 57
There certainly appeared to b-e issues of fact which warranted the
court's decision. For example, if the holding company could show that
its financial structure was not essentially different from other holding
companies unaffected by the proposed rule, it would b-e difficult for
the Commission to justify the rule. The decision is nevertheless suspect
because the court's views of due process at the time appear to have
been out of harmony withi those of the United States Supreme Court.5
In addition, it is not apparent from the decision that the court based its
ruling on the existence of questions of fact requiring oral hearing. As
previously shown, the fact that the agency rule was based on individual
grounds is not enough to require hearing. Thus the contest between the
Commission and the holding company which preceded the notice of
rule-making and the letter stating that the rule was primarily applicable
to Pittsburgh Railways did not mean a hearing was necessary.
In United States v. Nugent,59 the Supreme Court held that the hearing
prescribed by the Selective Service Act for persons claiming conscientious objector status did not entitle such a person to a copy of the FBI
report with a right to confront witnesses quoted or named in the report.
To the contention that these rights were guaranteed by the fifth amendn'ent, the Court said, "We cannot agree." 10 Here was certainly a
57 Id. at 817.

58 In that same year the court said in L.B. Wilson, Inc. v. FCC, 170 F.2d 793 (D.C.
Cir. 1948) that due process hearing requirements apply even to a question of law and
added:
Due process requires not only opportunity for the presentation of evidence and
cross-examination of witnesses but also opportunity for argument. Id. at 805.
Such views are at odds with FCC v. WJR, The Goodwill Station, Inc., 337 U.S. 265
(1949) in which the Supreme Court held that due process does not require oral argument
"particularly upon questions of law."
59 346 U.S. 1 (1953).
60 Id. at 9. The Court relied upon its prior decisions in Norwegian Nitrogen Prod.
Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294 (1933) and Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241
(1949). In the former, the Court held that a Norwegian importer was not entitled to
cross-examine an American importer on its costs in a proceeding before the Tariff
Commission fixing import duties; in the latter, a convicted murderer denied access to a
probation report and other information relied upon by the sentencing court was held
not to have been denied due process. These cases involve discretionary action of
decision makers and other special circumstances in which a trial-type hearing is not
required. The Court's reliance upon them seems to indicate no more than the fact that
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case of .individualized fact-finding and yet a trial-type hearing.with a
right of cross-examination was denied. Thus, the language of the Philadelphia Co. decision does not square with the prevailing law of due
piocess although there were issues of fact which brought the result
into harmony with due process standards.
In Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Smith, 61 an action to enjoin the Secretary of
theI Int~rior from granting applications for oil imports, the court found
no vice in a limited hearing, saying:
[I]t is far from clear that failure to grant a trial-type hearing is necessarily a denial of due process. 62
As understatement, this is not an inaccurate summary of the law. Due
process, as applied by the courts, simply means a fair opportunity to7 be
heard in the light of the circumstances. The results do not vary according to whether the administrative action entails individualized factfinding or legislative prescription and language in early decisions to the"
contrary appears to have no effect in later decisions. Cross-examination
has" not been elevated to a fundamental right of due process. On the
other hand, the behavior of the courts in this field is flexible enough to
suggest that if the circumstances were such that a party could show
that the opportunity to be heard would be denied without cross-examination, cross-examination could be considered a right of due process.
B. The Statutory Cases
Before the adoption of the Administrative Procedure Act the courts
tended to equate administrative hearings with judicial proceedings.
There was nevertheless a seeming metamorphosis of view regarding
cross-examination. At first it was rigidly insisted upon, then it was not
inentioned at all, or it was held not to be required.
Thus, in 1913 the Supreme Court declared in ICC v. Louisville &
Nashville' Railroad Co.,63 that a rate-making statute prescribing a "full
hearing" meant thatthe circumstances determine what kind of hearing is necessary for due process. A
similar result has been reached in United States v. Watson, 442 F.2d 1273 (8th Cir. 1971).
61 293 F. Supp. 1111 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
621d. at 1114. Cf. FCC v. WJR, The Goodwill Station, Inc., 337 U.S. 265, 275-76
(1949); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 436 (1944).
63 227 US. 88 (1913).
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All parties must be fully apprised of the evidence submitted or to be
considered, and must be given opportunity to cross-examine witnesses,
to inspect documents and to offer evidence in explanation or rebuttal.
In no other way can a party maintain its rights or make its defense. 64
Later, in Morgan v. United States,65 the Court held that a "full hearing"
statute has "regard to judicial standards,-not in any technical sense but
with respect to those fundamental requirements of fairness which are
of the essence of due process in a proceeding of a judicial nature." 66
Nowhere does the Court refer to cross-examination.67 This omission
was presaged by the decision in Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v.
United States,68 in which it was held that the statutory right to "hearing" before the Tariff Commission did not include the right to cross6
examination. 1
With the advent of the Administrative Procedure Act in 194670 there
was greater certainty as to the meaning of the right of cross-examination.
Section 7 (c) of that Act provides thatA party is entitled to present his case or defense by oral or documentary evidence, to submit rebuttal evidence, and to conduct such
cross-examination as may be required for a full and true disclosure
71
of the facts.

Written evidence is expressly sanctioned in the same Section:
64 Id. at 93. The Court was responding to the discredited contention that the Interstate Commerce Commission need not confine itself to the record because "having been
given legislative power to make rates it can act, as could Congress" on information
de hors the record. In 1937 the Court held that use of extra record facts by a state
commission is a denial of due process when the parties are given no prior notice or
opportunity for rebuttal and no mention was made of a right to cross-examination. Ohio
Bell Tel. Co. v. PUC, 301 U.S. 292 (1937). See cases cited note 55 supra.
65 304 U.S. 1 (1938).
66 Id. at 19. Comparable language appears in the first Morgan case, Morgan v. United
States, 298 U.S. 468, 480 (1936). In the first case the Court emphasized the non-technical
nature of the requirement, saying:
Argument may be oral or written. The requirements are not technical. But
there must be a hearing in a substantial sense. 298 U.S. at 481.
67 Cf. Gonzales v. United States, 348 U.S. 407, 415 (1955) (in Selective Service case
conscientious objector entitled to review of Department of Justice findings before
ruling by Appeals Board-no mention of cross-examination).
68 288 U.S. 294 (1933). See note 60 supra.
691d. at 318-19.
70 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59 (1970).
711Id. 5 556(d).
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In rule making or determining claims for money or benefits or applications for initial licenses an agency may, when a party will'not be
prejudiced thereby, adopt procedures for the submission of all or part
2
of the evidence in written form
Noting the difference in language in the two provisions the Attorney
.I'eneraFs Manual states:
It is concluded that [the first] provision is intended to emphasize the
right of parties in cases of adjudication (other than determining claims
for money or benefits or applications for initial licenses) to present
their evidence*orally, and in addition to present such "documentary
evidence" as would be admissible in judicial proceedings, such as writings and records made in regular course of business. As here used
"documentary evidence" does not mean affidavits and written evidence
of any kind. Such a construction would flood agency proceedings
with hearsay evidence. In the last sentence of the subsection, there
appears the phrase "evidence in written form," thus indicating that
the Congress distinguished between "written evidence" and "documentary evidence." 73
This seeming endorsement of oral hearings is followed by the explanation that it does not preclude use of written evidence in adjudicatory proceedings and that cross-examination may properly be restricted
to that which is necessary "for a full and true disclosure of the facts." 7It is acknowledged that "technical and statistical data may be introduced
in convenient and written form subject to adequate opportunity for
cross-examination and rebuttal." 75
The Manual further notes that the Act does not confer a "right of
so-called 'unlimited' cross-examination." 71 It adds that "the test isas the section states-whether it is required 'for a full and true disclosure
of the facts.' "7
The Manual then turns to legislative history on rule-making, saying:
In many rule-making proceedings where the subject matter and evidence are broadly economic or statistical in character and the parties
72 Id.
73 1947 ATr'y
74 ld.at

77-78.

76 Id.
76 ld. at 78.
771d.

GEw. MAINuAL

ON THE ADMINISTRAVE

P. Acr 77.
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or witnesses numerous, the direct or rebuttal evidence may be of such
a nature that cross-examination adds nothing substantial to the record
and unnecessarily prolongs the hearings. 78
Continuing on the subject of rule-making (i.e., rate-making, licensing,
and determinations of claims for money or benefits) it is said that agencies may require that "the mass" of extensive technical or statistical
data shall be submitted in writing.79 Since "the veracity and demeanor
of witnesses are not important" in such a situation, "it is difficult to see
how any party's interests would be prejudiced by such procedures
where sufficient opportunity for rebuttal exists." 80 Nevertheless, "to
the extent that cross-examination is necessary to bring out the truth,
the party should have it." 81
The Manual thus recognizes that written evidence may be substituted
for oral hearing subject to a demonstrated need for a "full and true
disclosure of the facts." Moreover, although a distinction is made between adjudicatory proceedings and rule-making, the rule on crossexamination is not significantly different in either case. If cross-examination is shown to be necessary to get at the truth, it would be
afforded regardless of the underlying classification of the case.
Decisions by the courts reflect principles stated in the Attorney
General's Manual. The dichotomy of adjudication and rule-making is
recognized and given substance.8 2 Any difference in the right of crossexamination accorded in the two situations, however, is not discernible.
In both types of cases, the courts have held that cross-examination may
be limited, 83 waived 84 and eliminated altogether.85 It is further held in
78Id. [quoting H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1946) and S. Doc. No.
248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 271 (1946)].
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id. [quoting H.R. RF,. No. 1980, 79th Cong, 2d Sess. 37 (1946) and S. REP. No.
752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1945) ].
82 See Willapoint Oysters, Inc. v. Ewing, 174 F.2d 676, 692-95 (9th Cir), cert. denied,
338 U.S. 860 (1949).
83 Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 385 U.S. 57 (1966) (adjudication holding
there is no right to cross-examine on amended agreement when there was cross-examination on original); Williams v. Zuckert, 371 U.S. 531 (1963) (adjudicatory case in
which regulation limiting cross-examination to witnesses appearing pursuant to prehearing arrangements approved over dissent of Justice Douglas who felt due process
issue was presented); Wilson & Co. v. United States, 335 F.2d 788 (7th Cir. 1964) (in
rule-making proceeding to review rate order of Federal Communications Commission,
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both adjudication and rule-making that hearsay evidence depriving
parties of an opportunity to cross-!examine is proper "so long as the
evidence upon which an order is ultimately based is both substantial and
has probative value."

86

The capstone of these authorities is the Supreme

,Court's recent decision that written hearsay evidence conflicting with
live testimony can itself satisfy the substantial evidence test in a case of
87
adjudication.
The contrasting cases are those in which it has been demonstrated
that cross-examination is the only satisfactory means of obtaining a full
and true disclosure of the facts. An example is Wirtz v. Baldor Electric
late filing intervenors properly excluded from cross-examination of earlier appearing
witnesses).
84
Williams v. Zuckert, 371 US. 531 (1963); NLRB v. Carlton Wood Prod. Co., 201
F.2d 863 (9th Cir. 1953) (adjudication for refusal to bargain in which right to hearing
waived); Freight Consol. Coop., Inc. v. United States, 230 F. Supp. 692 (S.D.N.Y. 1964)
(adjudicatory action for cease and desist order against illegal freight forwarder operations
in which opportunity for cross-examination not taken up and later claim of unfair hearing
rejected).
85 United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192, 205 (1956) (under "full
hearing" statute Federal Communications Commission need not hold hearing if applicant makes insufficient prehearing showing); NLRB v. Air Control Prod. of St.
Petersburg, Inc, 335 F.2d 245, 249 (5th Cir. 1964) (adjudication of unfair labor practice
in which it was held that the claimed issue of fact showed no basis for hearing); Vapor
Blast Independent Shop Workers Ass'n v. Simon, 305 F.2d 717 (7th Cir. 1962) (adjudication: NLRB back pay awards do not require hearing for the affected employee).
86 Montana Power Co. v. FPC, 185 F.2d 491, 498 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (licensing by Federal
Power Commission which the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551(6), (7)
(1970) declares to be adjudication); Willapoint Oysters, Inc. v. Ewing, 174 F.2d 676,
690 (9th Cir. 1949) (rule-making).
87 Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971). The case involved an adjudication of a
claim for disability under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i) (1) and 423(d) (1)
(1970). It was held that written reports of doctors, not subject to cross-examination
and in conflict with medical evidence offered at an oral hearing, constitute substantial
evidence despite their hearsay character. The claimant had failed to take advantage of.
te opportunity to subpoena for cross-examination the doctors who submitted the
written reports. The Court said:
We conclude that a written report by a licensed physician who has examined
the claimant and who sets forth in his report his medical findings in his area of
competence may be received as evidence in a disability hearing and, despite its
hearsay character and an absence of cross-examination, and despite the presence
of opposing direct medical testimony and testimony by the claimant himself, may
constitute substantial evidence supportive of a finding by the hearing examiner
adverse to the claimant, when the claimant has not exercised his right to subpoena the reporting physician and thereby provide himself with the. opportunity
for cross-examination of the physician. 402 U.S. at 402.
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Co.,88 where the Secretary of Labor based a Walsh-Healey Act89 mini-

mum wage order on the tabulated summary of a confidential survey of
wages paid in the electrical motors and generators industry. The tabulation was admitted into the record of a hearing before the Department
of Labor over the objections of Baldor Electric, which had been refused
an opportunity to inspect the data underlying the survey and had presented evidence in affidavit form showing that persons queried in the
survey had given inaccurate or misunderstood information. On appeal,
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
held that under these circumstances the order was not supported by
"reliable, probative and substantial evidence" as required by the Administrative Procedure Act.9" Pointing to the fact that amendment of the
Walsh-Healey Act required determinations under the statute to be "made
on the record after opportunity for a hearing," 91 the court concluded
that Section 7 (c) of the Administrative Procedure Act was applicable,
allowing the parties "to submit rebuttal evidence, and to conduct such
cross-examination as may be required for a full and true disclosure of
the facts." 92 The court added that the fact the proceeding was rulemaking in nature was irrelevant where the determination must be "made
on the'record after opportunity for an agency hearing" because such
language requires adjudicatory procedure.9 3 Baldor Electric was entitled to cross-examination and rebuttal, the court held, and these were
effectively denied when it was refused access to the data underlying the
survey tabulation. 94 Disclosure of the data was not compelled, however, where the Government desired confidentiality; instead the order
was declared invalid and in the future the Government could 'either run
the risk of an invalid order or make proper disclosure for cross-examination.95
88 337 F.2d 518 (D.C. Cir. 1963). See also Southern Stevedoring Co. v. Voris, 190
F.2d 275 (5th Cir. 1951) (compensation for injury subject to Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act determined on basis of letters from medical doctors, rejecting sworn testimony of other doctors. Held, "the right of cross-examination waseffectively denied appellants upon a crucial issue." Id. at 277).
8941 U.S.C. §§ 35-45 (1970).
90 See Sections 7(c) and 10(e) of the Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 556, 706 (1970).

91337 F.2d at 521. Section 5 of the Administrative Procedure Act treats such statutes
as requiring an adjudicatory proceeding. 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1970).
92 337 F.2d at 521.
93 Id. at 521 n.4.
941d. at 529.

95 Id. at 528; accord, J.D. Hedin Constr. Co., v. United States, 408 F.2d 424 (Ct. C.

1972J

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS

The court emphasized that Baldor Electric had "mounted a strong
attack on the reliability of the survey" and had demonstrated meaningful errors."6 These were special circumstances. It was not, the court
said, deciding what disclosures would be necessary in other cases in7
volving confidential surveys.9
Baldor was rule-making converted to adjudication by statute. While
the existence of the statutory conversion is significant in that without
it there would have been no right to a hearing, 98 it is not significant in
determining whether the right of cross-examination is any different in
rule-making than it is in adjudication. This is indicated by the decision
in PowhatanMining Co. v. Ickes,99 a rule-making proceeding antedating
the Administrative Procedure Act. In prescribing minimum prices for
coal under the Bituminous Coal Act of 1937, the Secretary of the Interior relied upon a tabulation of coal prices allegedly in competition
with Powhatan, among other parties. The parties sought decoding of the
tabulation for purposes of cross-examination claiming, inter alia, that
some of the prices could have been the result of distress sales, and
therefore, not probative of established minimum prices. The request
was denied and judicial review was sought. The case was remanded for
rehearing on the ground that petitioners were denied a fair hearing by
the exclusion of cross-examination. 10
1969), involving use by the Veterans Administration of statements of witnesses not
subject to cross-examination. The court held that the findings were not supported by
substantial evidence because the procedure robs the "administrative findings of the
weight to which they would be entitled if there had been a true adversary process and
the findings had been grounded in oral testimony subject to cross-examination (or on
true documentary evidence subject to close scrutiny)." Id. at 428. The language of the
court suggests an adversary written procedure may have been acceptable.
96 337 F.2d at 529.
97 id. at 530-31.
OSee Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940). The Walsh-Healey Act
provides for the setting of minimum wages for Government contractors only. It provides one of the conditions under which the Government will make purchases. Accordingly, there would be no standing, as Perkins held, to challenge orders under the Act
unless such standing was conferred by statute as it was by the time the Baldor case
arose.

99 118 F.2d 105 (6th Cir. 1941).
100 The statute required a hearing and the Povhatan court interpreted this to mean
a "full hearing," citing ICC v. Louisville & N.R.R, 227 U.S. 88 (1-913) as well as the
first Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468 (1936). It held that a full hearing "includes
the right to cross-examine." 118 F.2d at 109. Under the circumstances of the case, the
.court's holding is in accord with what is here contended is the correct rule.
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Both Baldor and Powhatan involved information of crucial importance to a decision which was credibly challenged. This was not the case
in Red Star Manufacturing Co. v. Grimes.' There the Wage-Hour
Administrator had established minimum wages for the Puerto Rican
pearl button and buckle industry and denied disclosure of the names of
two unidentified mainland firms whose production costs were contained
in a statistical report included in the record. Petitioning Puerto Rican
manufacturers contended on judicial review that this deprived them of a
fair hearing by limiting cross-examination. The court held that the
relevant section of the Fair Labor Standards Act' 0 2 was designed "for
the protection of mainland industry, and was not intended to confer
rights upon industrial firms in Puerto Rico." 103 For this reason, the petitioners were held not to be prejudiced by the limitation of crossexamination. 04 Although the court referred to the legislative character
of the proceeding and cited Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. vu.
United States,0 5 the actual basis for the decision was the court's final
statement thatin question was not of substantial importance in
[T]he information
10 6
this proceeding.
C. The Rule Established by the Cases
In the universe of cross-examination the concepts of due process, rulemaking and adjudication are the moons, not the suns. The light they
emit and their visible character are reflections of their surroundings.
Whether the right of cross-examination exists in any particular case depends upon the importance of the issue, the believability of the challenge
to asserted facts and the necessity of cross-examination to arrive at a
full and true disclosure of the facts. The verbalization of the right may
b'e in terms of due process or the nature of the administrative proceeding, but the motivating considerations are the circumstances in which
the right is claimed. What the courts appear to be doing is assuring an
opportunity to be heard by a fair hearing likely to lead to a just result.
101 221 F.2d 524 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
102 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1970).
103 221 F.2d at 530.
104 Id.
105 288 U.S. 294 (1933). See note 60 supra.
106 221 F.2d at 530.

1972]

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS

This may or may not require cross-examination. It is, in any case, not
inconsistent with the substitution of written evidence for oral hearing7
except to the extent that cross-examination is shown to be necessary.1
The burden rests upon the proponent of cross-examination to demonstrate its necessity. 08 When the burden is met, resort to written evidence
must be suspended to the extent of the disputed facts.
III. A

PROPOSED RULE FOR SUBSTITUTION OF WRITTEN
EVIDENCE FOR ORAL HEARINGS

The pioneers in this field have been the Department of Agriculture
and the Interstate Commerce Commission. The Department applied its
rules for "shortened procedure" to reparation proceedings. For claims
under $500 the shortened procedure was automatically invoked unless
Department officers determined otherwise sua sponte or upon application
of one of the parties "setting forth the peculiar facts making such hearing necessary for a proper presentation of the case." 109 The procedure
was available for larger claims if consent of the parties was obtained." 0
At the Interstate Commerce Commission, which initiated shortened procedure as early as 1923, hearing officers initially invoked the procedure
on notice to the parties."' If any party objected, however, the procedure
would not be employed."

2

Today the Interstate Commerce Commission, which calls the no
hearing technique "modified procedure," does not depend upon consent of the parties. Applicants for licenses from the Commission can
request handling without oral hearing." 3 On the basis of the pleadings,
107 See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944). In Gonzales v. United States,
348 U.S. 407 (1955) the Court held a conscientious objector under the Selective Service
Act is entitled to a copy of Department of Justice findings before a ruling by the
Appeals Board.
We refused to compel "an all-out collateral attack at the [Department of Justice]
hearing on the testimony obtained in its prehearing investigation." Here all that
is involved is the mailing of a copy of the Department's recommendation to the
registrant and permitting a reply to the Appeal Board. Id. at 414.
This is simply another way of saying that a trial type of hearing will not be allowed
and that written procedure is adequate.
108 Cf. United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956).
10 9
See Arv'y GEN. REP. 405.
110 Id.

11 Id. at 406.
112 Id.
'11 ICC Rules of Practice, 49 C.F.R. § 1100.247(b) (3) (1971).
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hearing officers will decide in license application proceedings, as well as
others, whether the procedure is to be ordered.11 4 If it is ordered, the
parties thereafter file verified statements and argument in sequence.",
The verified statements are given by persons who have knowledge of
the facts and who would appear as witnesses if the oral hearing were
held. 116 Any party desiring cross-examination must identify the witness,
stare the subject matter and show the reason for the request. 117 The request must be included in the response to the verified statement on
which cross-examination is desired. 118 If cross-examination is approved
there is an oral hearing limited to the scope of the approval."19
The pertinent rule states:
(a) Request for cross-examination or other hearing. If cross-examinadon of any witness is desired the name of the witness and the subject
matter of the desired cross-examination shall, together with any other
request for oral hearing, including the basis therefor, be stated at the
end of defendant's statement or complainant's statement in reply as the
case may be. Unless material facts are in dispute, oral hearing will
120
not be held for the sole purpose of cross-examination.
While expressing reluctance to do so, the Commission has denied
cross-examination under this rule.' 2' It is not -enough to object to receipt of written evidence and request oral hearing; material facts must
21
be placed in issue.
A model rule, based upon the Commission's rule, could be framed as
follows:
If cross-examination of any witness is desired, the name of the witness
and the subject matter of the desired cross-examination shall, together
with a statement of why cross-examination is necessary, be set forth
at the end of the statement, exhibit or other response to the written
testimony of the witness as to whom cross-examination is requested.
"i41d. § 1100.45.
115 Id. § 1100.49.
"16d. § -1100.50.
1li d. § 1100.53 (a).
i'81d.
119 Id. § 1100.53 (b).

120 Id.§ 1100.53 (a).
121 See, e.g., Steel, Inc. v. Chicago B. & Q.R.R., 323 I.C.C. 509 (1964); Foodstuffs front
Hudson, N.Y. to Chicago, Ill.,
315 I.C.C. 184 (1961).
122 Steel, Inc. v. Chicago B. & Q.R.R., 323 I.C.C. 509, 516 (1964).
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Cross-examination will not be ordered unless it is shown to relate to
a material issue and to be necessary for a full and true disclosure of the

facts.123

It would not be sufficient under this rule merely to object to a witness'
written testimony and supporting exhibits. The proponent of crossexamination would be required to show necessity. The first requisite
would be a showing that the written testimony for which cross-examination is desired relates to a material issue. Whether it is necessary for a
full and true disclosure of the facts would depend on showing that the
written testimony (1) conflicts with other probative evidence in the
case, (2) omits material facts, (3) is inaccurate or (4) is otherwise
questionable. A substitute for that kind of showing could be a demonstration that facts in dispute are peculiarly within the knowledge of the
witness and the only means of obtaining a full and true disclosure is
cross-examination. 124 The proponent should further be required to
show that other means of achieving a full and true disclosure are not
reasonably available. If, for example, the information needed is available
in public documents, the cross-examination should not be ordered. 2 5
123 This proposal is similar to that contained in the 1955 FINAL REP. OF THE PRES. CoNF.
ox ADD~'n-srATna P. 38-41 except that it puts a greater burden on the proponent to
show the necessity for cross-examination. The Conference recommendation appears to
have express judicial approval. See Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 223 F.2d 348,
354 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
124 Special emphasis needs to be placed on cross-examination in cases in which there

is no separation of functions in the decisional process. There is wide-spread criticism
of the practice. See AT&T v. FCC, Civil No. 35845 (2d Cir, July 22, 1971); ADMINi5nATivE CoNp. OF THE UNITED STATES, Comm. ON RULE MARmN, WpRovEMENrs IN THE
CoNDucr OF FED. RATE PROCEEDINGS (Recommendation No. 19), S. Doc. No. 24, 88th

Cong., Ist Sess. 69-114 (1963); Ross, Current ABA Proposals for Amendment of the
Administrative Procedure Act, 23 ADM. L. REv. 67 (1970). It is nevertheless followed
in some rate-making and initial licensing. The Federal Communications Commission
does not separate functions in many rate-making cases. Compare In re AT&T Charges
For Domestic Telephone Service, 27 F.C.C.2d 151, 167 (1971), [and] In re Communications Satellite Corporation, 27 F.C.C.2d 927 (1971), with In re AT&T Private-Line
Services, (F.C.C. 71-1063, 1971). Under this procedure, the staff of the agency participates as a party in the hearing and prepares the recommended decision. The principal
difficulty is the lack of disclosure of the trial staffs positions on key issues until the appearance of the recommended decision, after it is too late for cross-examination or
rebuttal. In the absence of a full disclosure by the staff of the positions it will take in the
preparation of the recommended decision, other parties need to cross-examine staff
witnesses if they are to have the same opportunity as the staff to meet the material
issues.
125

Much information about competitors is readily available in the public document
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The burdens this would place on the proponent are not unusual. They
are not unlike burdens assumed for years by persons seeking trial ma1 26
terial, including production of documents, in litigated cases.
The proposed rule should be made applicable to all proceedings (route,
rate, acquisitions and so forth) where detailed economic, scientific and
other statistical data are a major part of the evidence. Exceptions would
be appropriate for enforcement proceedings and others of a similar
nature involving facts, the accuracy of which turns on the witness' veracity, memory and ability or capacity to observe.
Proposals have been made by distinguished observers and participants
in the administrative scene for use of written evidence on the basis of
other criteria, such as the nature of the issue 127 or the character of the
fact in dispute. 12s These criteria are useful in determining when a formal
hearing with cross-examination should be allowed. The courts and
rooms of federal, as well as state, agencies. This has always been a prolific source of
material for cross-examination and rebuttal in administrative proceedings.
126 The rule is directed to procedure in lieu of trial. It is not preheating discovery.
Therefore, the liberal procedures for discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which place little burden on one seeking pretrial information are not applicable.
A better analogy is the procedure for showing "good cause" under Rules 33, 34, and
45 of the Federal Rules. See, e.g., 4A J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRacncE 34.08 (2d ed. 1971);
5A J. MoouR, FEDERAL PRACrcE 45.05 (2d ed. 1971).
127 The late Dean Landis proposed a division of route proceedings before the CAB
into route and carrier selection phases. The latter would be handled in trial-type proceedings, the former in a kind of informal rule-making. He said:
Routes that in the public interest should be flown are capable of being determined
without resort to proceedings of this character (i.e., trial-type) but as a result
of staff studies carried on in a less formal manner. Evidence now being presented
in a formal manner as to the needs of various communities for service, as to the
community of interest between communities, as to the desirability for increased
competition or the existence of sufficient adequate surface transportation, as to
the type of service required and the potentiality of generating a sufficient quantum
of air traffic, can all be determined beforehand by less legalistic and reasonably
scientific methods, leaving for a "judicialized" hearing only the issue as to which
of the conflicting carriers is to be selected for certification on any particular
route. If necessary, hearings could be held on the staff study itself, which could
also be of a less formal type.
LANDIs REPoRT 42.
128 Professor Davis proposed a distinction between adjudicatory facts and legislative
facts. Written evidence would be sufficient for the latter but not the former. 1 K.
DAVIs, ADMImSTRATVE LAW TlEArisE 413 (1958). He defines these terms as follows:
Adjudicative facts are the facts about the parties and their activities, businesses,
and properties. Adjudicative facts usually answer the questions of who did what,
where, when, how, why, with what motive or intent; adjudicative facts are roughly
the kind of facts that go to a jury in a jury case. Legislative facts do not usually
concern the immediate parties but are general facts which help the tribunal decide
questions of law and policy and discretion.
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Congress (in the Administrative Procedure Act), however, have approached the problem in other terms, using fair hearing and full and
true disclosure standards. Shaping a rule after those standards should
lead to less controversy and fewer diversions with greater efficiency. 129
Under the proposed rule only two procedures would be added to the
practice followed by most administrative agencies at the present time.
One would be written interrogatories or requested admissions by parties
desiring clarification or written cross-examination of testimony in writing. The other would be the request for oral cross-examination, if any.
The Final Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure refers to a "hearing for clarification or cross-examination if it were desired." 130 There will, of course, be instances where
clarification is needed to prepare rebuttal to any testimony, written or
oral. The responses, however, do not bring in question the credibility
of the witness and an oral hearing is not necessary. The time honored
technique of written interrogatories would serve the purpose as -Well or
even better. In respect to cross-examination which goes beyond clarification, there will be many instances where requests for admissions or
written interrogatories will satisfy the needs of the parties.'' These opportunities should be available to the parties in conjunction with a rule
for use of written evidence.
With these additions, the usual procedure of most administrative
agencies would be as follows under the proposed rule:
1. Notice or other institution of proceeding.
2. Prehearing conference, including preheating motions and comments of parties.
3. Exchange of exhibits, including statistical data, and related testimony under oath.
4. Written interrogatories for clarification or requested admissions
plus written interrogatories in lieu of cross-examination.
129The proposal of Dean Landis for route and carrier selection phases in route proceedings does not eliminate the question of cross-examination in the former and could
lead to two oral proceedings instead of one. The distinctions proposed by Professor
Davis lend themselves to the rule proposed herein as aids in defining the right of crossexamination. However, they pose a risk of differing from court and congressional
standards which many litigating parties and agencies would seek to avoid. For this
reason, the rule should not he anchored to such distinctions.
130AT'y GEN. REP. 69.

131 For procedure on requested admissions, see FED. R. Civ. P. 36; U.S. CT. Cr.. R. 42.
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5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Exchange of rebuttal exhibits and related testimony under oath.
Requests for cross-examination in oral hearing, if any.
Order for oral hearing, if any.
Oral hearing.
Briefs (if not included in items 3 and 5).
Decision by hearing examiner.
Exceptions to report of hearing examiner and supporting briefs.
Oral argument.
Decision by agency.

The added steps are items 4 and 6. In exhange for this, the oral hearing
may be eliminated or limited to cross-examination. The savings in oral
hearing, will, in the usual case, more than offset time and effort devoted
to the added procedures.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Hearing procedures are notoriously time-consuming and they are
often the least effective means of arriving at the facts. Simply setting the
date of hearings frequently involves considerable time because of the
need to accommodate the schedules of the hearing officer, counsel and
the witnesses. The hearing itself takes additional time. After the hearing the parties and the decision-maker are confronted with another bulky
reference, i.e., the transcript of the hearing, in marshalling the facts and
applying law or policy. This prolongs the briefing and decision time in
the case. It may also introduce confusion which leads to error.
In this age of technology and change, proceedings are becoming more
complicated rather than simpler. This is compounding the problems with
oral hearings. There should be a more efficient way of dealing with the
masses of material and facts necessary to decision of complex matters.
The substitution of written evidence for oral hearing is a reasonable
approach to time savings and simplification of procedure which has
already been successfully employed by two federal agencies. It requires
no changes in law and is based upon techniques familiar to the courts,
the agencies and persons appearing regularly before them. It is surely
an idea whose time has come.

